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Abstract: This paper explores the conceptual terrain of what we term late globalization. The 
late globalization phenomena are multilevel and multidimensional; this paper offers an initial 
portal into these phenomena. Understanding late globalization would provide academic 
insights and help in shaping practices at international, national, sectoral and corporate levels. 
The paper follows a macro-conceptual to a micro-empirical path to provide illustrative 
empirical evidence. Studying the emergence and evolution of Danish Textile and Fashion 
Industry (DTFI) between 1945 and 2015 – a quintessential sector for globalization – allows 
the examination of several interrelated issues: critical events, impediments, pressures and 
turning points that shaped DTFI; main institutional players that motivated key policy changes 
in and evolution of DTFI; and effects of late globalization on size, mission, location, 
knowledge, growth and structure of DTFI. This longitudinal case study of the development of 
the DTFI brings to the fore key features that shape late globalization at the sectoral-national 
level: government industrial policies toward domestic and foreign players in an industry, 
global competition that shapes and continually reshapes (cost as well as quality-driven) 
location of key value chain activities (and the concomitant global distribution of core 
competencies and skills), and the growing role of information technologies that enable 
globally-dispersed value chains to function in cohesive and unified ways. Late globalization 
has additional levels and dimensions; and we point to implications for future research. 
 
 
Keywords: Late Globalization; Industrial Policy; International Business Policy; Industry 
Emergence; Industry Evolution; Theory Building; Textile and Fashion; Denmark 
 
 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
We want to explore the conceptual terrain of what we term late globalization, a terrain that 
has temporal and spatial aspects, and multiple levels and dimensions. The Danish Textile and 
Fashion Industry (DTFI) is a late globalizer, and is examined to add an illustrative empirical 
angle. The theoretical intent of the paper is wider – to create a stepping stone for a long 
journey into multiple dimensions and phenomena of late globalization.  
Why is exploring late globalization important? It is important because life-cycles of 
phenomena provide ways to anticipate and plan for what is ahead. In an epochal sense, we are 
well into ‘late’ globalization, as some cultural theorists argue. In specific national-sectoral 
senses, there are many instances of ‘lateness’ in globalization and cross-learning opportunities 
abound. Finally, in a futuristic sense, we are approaching rapidly the end of the Magellanic 
era – in which human activities were confined to a round ‘global’ earth – and are stepping 
into an accelerating extraterrestrial-postglobal phase of economic and social life. International 
business policy researchers, policymakers and managers, we believe, would find explorations 
of late globalization phenomena – in all the unfolding dimensions – to be challenging, 
insightful and relevant for shaping future practices. We seek to open an initial portal here. 
The specific pattern of DTFI, with ups and downs, policy and technology innovations 
and adaptations, provides a particular window into late globalization processes and sets a 
stage for further exploration of the late globalization phenomena. The reason DTFI is useful 
as an empirical context is because textiles represent the quintessential first industry 
(Manchester, Liverpool, New England; even the Madeira/Textiles comparative advantage 
example from Ricardo) to be buffeted by multiple waves of globalization (and de-
globalization). Hence, an ultra-late globalizing textiles case from an advanced Scandinavian 
economy provides strong insights into aspects of ‘lateness’. 
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We follow a macro-conceptual to a micro-empirical path. The next section discusses 
the multidisciplinary and multifaceted field of late globalization. Then, since DTFI is a 
specific case of late globalization, we have a substantial section on the historic-analytic 
approach that we employed to study DTFI. We then draw out very specific, empirically 
derived, conceptual themes about the patterns of global interactions that characterized the 
specific evolutionary trajectory of DTFI. We do return briefly to a final macro-conceptual 
section on late globalization, acknowledging that the particular DTFI case study does suggest 
further pathways to explore late globalization. We end with some suggested for future 
research directions for late globalization. 
 
Late Globalization: Conceptual Terrain 
When Friedman (2005) deliberately evoked the ‘flat world’ metaphor for an of-course-round 
global world, he was emphasizing the breakneck pace of globalization – with the implication 
that we are in a really advanced phase of globalization. Late globalization refers to relatively 
new sets of phenomena. While not using the term late globalization explicitly, Appadurai 
(1990), recognizing the five cross-national interconnecting and intermingling scapes – 
ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes – provided a first major 
window on late globalization from a lifecycle of globalization sense looks and feels like. 
Literary theorist Moraru (2011) has gone a step beyond, and introduced the term late 
globalization, in a lifecycle-of-globalization sense, implying that globalization is in a late-
geriatric phase.   
In contrast to economic and entrepreneurship theorists, to culture theorists, 
‘globalization’ has been happening for a very long time, even a couple of millennia, if we take 
the early perilous journeys of Silk Road and the seafaring merchant-adventurers, traveling 
perilous routes by long caravans or in very early sailing boats. From a culture theory lens, 
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globalization stretched over centuries, starting with the early-explorers phase, expanding into 
a long phase of merchants-imperialists from Europe, and maturing in the 20th century. In this 
sense, globalization is now likely in a late maturity phase, with the intensity of cultural traffic 
at an all-time high. Such long-historical views, however, are of limited utility when particular 
nations, sectors, industries, companies – and specific individual or institutional actors – are 
grappling with practical aspects of late globalization affecting their situations, fortunes, and 
prospects. The DTFI case, discussed later, shows the complexity – in practice – of the actual 
late-globalizing aspects in a specific country-industry setting. 
The cultural lifecycle-of-globalization concept(s) of late globalization could extend 
and interact with other disciplinary dimensions – economic, political, sociological, 
technological and more (Turcan, 2016; Martin, Tyler, Storper, Evenhuis, & Glasmeiser, 
2018). This paper takes a small step in this regard. It develops fine-grained, substantive 
details of the DTFI case that would contribute towards the development of a theory (or 
theories) of late globalization.  
 
Late Globalization: Multiple Senses 
The late globalization angle has to be developed carefully. The act of being late in whatever 
aspect of globalization – whether it is deliberate, serendipitous, or for other reasons – often 
means that, in many traditional industries (say automobiles), opportunities were cornered by 
the early globalizers. New entrants got spaces only after meteoric economic (Japan, Korea) or 
revolutionary technological (Tesla) transformations. Late globalizers, indeed, under 
propitious conditions (Japan, followed by Korea, in TV sets) often capitalize on and benefit 
from opportunities created by intersecting global events and strategic bets.  
The qualifiers early-late could be applied to countries or nations, functions or aspects 
of industries or sectors, as well as companies. The term late may refer to the timing of various 
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steps/forms of internationalization and globalization. Overall, the notion late produces a 
number of issues or questions. Late - by whose standard or definition? In the context of DTFI, 
for example, is the nature of “lateness” about (a) Danish firms in general, (b) Danish firms in 
textiles, (c) Scandinavian firms in textiles, (d) British firms in textiles, or (e) American firms 
in textiles?  
Alternately, switching tracks, late at what levels of analysis: country (Denmark), 
industry (textiles/DTFI), company (Kvadrat), process (manufacturing, R&D, marketing), 
strategic alliances (value chains, value locations, intellectual property issues). International 
angles bring additional early-late combinations or intersections: (a) Denmark late globalizer, 
but China early globalizer; (b) Denmark late globalizer in textiles and Belarus also late 
globalizer (as supply source); (c) USA early globalizer in textiles and also China early 
globalizer (as supply base). One could also explore late at various dimensions within an 
industry, e.g., DTFI:  (a) manufacturing, (b) supply chain development, (c) market-seeking or 
resource-seeking, (d) process and strategy, (e) innovation, knowledge creation and diffusion, 
growth and structure.  
From the above, it is evident that there are several levels of analysis such as meta-
theoretical, macro, meso and micro levels. At macro (industry, nation and global) level, 
timing – being late or early globalizer – raises new questions about the benefits and 
drawbacks of being late or early globalizer. Is timing important? Should nations pursue 
globalization actively, consciously or not: to globalize or not? What consequences will such 
decisions have? Having embraced globalization, will there be an integration into global 
economy? Having opposed globalization, will there be a protective cover for domestic actors? 
The perception of globalization as something positive or negative will moderate the answers 
to this type of questions. Indeed, globalization “…is by no means wholly benign in its 
consequences” (Giddens, 2003, p. 15). Nations like UK, France, USA and Japan globalized 
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early, though Japan clearly much later than others. Also, Spain and Portugal globalized too 
early (pre-industrial era) to take advantages that became available (later) through the 
interaction of globalization and industrialization, something that the UK took full advantage 
of. In the post-World War II period internationalization of firms from the nations in the Soviet 
bloc was slow, as import-substituting industrialization was a key goal of Soviet and 
nonaligned developing nations, with globalization practically non-existent for many decades. 
Comparing China and India, China started these processes in 1971 and was an ‘early 
globalizer’ compared to India, a ‘late globalizer’ – it opened the doors to outside-in forces and 
processes only in 1991. In the post-Brexit and Trump presidency world, the forces that take a 
negative view of globalization are indeed somewhat ascendant – not from the resistive, 
postcolonial angle, but from a quixotic “aggrieved-and-miffed” imperialist angle. What if 
there is no (conscious) policy decision whether to globalize or not? What if, despite explicit or 
implicit policies to globalize or not, the opposite effect materializes inadvertently? When 
financial crisis started in 2008, Republic of Moldova did not ‘feel’ the crisis due to its non-
globalized economy. This made it less vulnerable to such global shocks. As a result, Republic 
of Moldova became the fifth most stable economy in the world (Turcan, 2013a).  
How late globalization affects industries – at meso level – is yet to be well understood. 
How does, for example, being late or early globalizer impact the fragmentation of value 
chains nationally and/or regionally, global policy and organization behaviour? How does it 
affect the relationship between internationalization and globalization? For example, local 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) become captive to multinational enterprises (Turcan, 
2012) and eventually follow multinational enterprises (MNEs), most of the time abandoning 
home markets. When MNEs reconfigure their global value chains, these captive SMEs 
become first victims of any global value chain reconfigurations that follow. De-
internationalization is an option for these SMEs (Turcan, 2003). The question, however, is 
  
7 
 
whether the industries SMEs abandoned are still there and if yes, whether there is still a room 
for them. These issues are still valid when MNEs also de-internationalize by bringing 
manufacturing back home or back-shoring. In recent years, back-shoring became a 
widespread phenomenon, its relevance being acknowledged by policymakers and 
practitioners (UNCTAD, 2013). Recent empirical evidence supports this assertion: between 
400 and 700 firms back-shore every year in Germany (Bals, 2015). Despite such evidence, 
however, de-internationalization phenomenon is under-researched (see, e.g., Dholakia, 
Kompella & Hales, 2012; Turcan, 2013b). 
At meso level, the interplay between late globalization, contexts and institutions also 
needs further research. The extant international business research focuses chiefly on the 
relationship between target markets’ contexts and institutions and MNE strategies (Sally, 
1994; Van Hoorn & Maseland, 2016; Lundan, 2018). Studying only MNEs and their 
strategies within this scope of enquiry limits our understanding of late globalization and its 
effects. International business policy researchers need to study a range of organizations (not 
just MNEs) that might produce not only interesting, but also paradoxical findings. Consider 
universities. Compared to MNEs, universities are late globalizers. Many renowned 
universities have gone global and recently started to withdraw from international markets 
primarily due to the incompatibility between university autonomy at home and in 
international target markets (Turcan & Gulieva, 2016). Due to such incompatibility between 
institutional settings, advanced internationalization of universities via high-risk, high-cost and 
high-commitment entry modes such as joint ventures, acquisitions, and greenfield or 
brownfield investments, becomes unethical (Turcan & Gulieva, 2016). Indeed, advanced-
internationalizing universities are often willing or forced to compromise on their ideals of 
academic freedom and autonomy. In the language of international business, they are willing 
or forced to adapt to local environment and culture. Such behaviour of different types of late 
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globalizers (such as universities) has an effect on internationalization and globalization 
policies and practices and at the same time questions the extant international business 
policies, theories and models. 
Since most of the rest of the paper is about DTFI, we offer this intermediate 
conceptual way-station about late globalization: 
 Levels: Late globalization phenomena can be examined at multiple levels – 
globe/planet (and, soon, beyond Earth), nations and sectors (Korean electronics, 
Indian software), industries (Danish textile-fashion), and firms (Tesla). 
 Process Aspects: At any level, careful exploration of key epochs, events, episodes, 
turning points, pressures, tussles, and other shaping forces would help in 
understanding late globalization at that level. 
 Integration: Since late globalization phenomena are complex, sound and 
parsimonious integration, hopefully done with some elegance, would advance the 
cause of theoretical and practical learning. 
With this backdrop discussion, we turn to the literature on industry emergence and 
evolution, and then delve into the DTFI case. 
 
Industries Emerging and Evolving 
How industries emerge and evolve, particularly in a very global world, is an enduring 
question that has received scant attention in academic research and needs to be further 
explored and studied. We emphasize ‘and’: traditionally the emergence of industries has been 
studied independently from the evolution of industries (Turcan & Fraser, 2016); and we 
advocate for a joint approach.  
Van de Ven and Garud (1989) and Aldrich and Fiol (1994) made one of the first 
attempts to conceptualize the emergence of new industries. Van de Ven and Garud (1989) 
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identify two levels at which the emergence of an industry could be studied: individual firm or 
entrepreneur level, and aggregate, system level. Van de Ven and Garud (1989, p. 200) suggest 
exploring the motivations, purposeful intentions and business ideas of entrepreneurs and 
argue that the emergence of a new industry is the result of ‘…cumulative achievements of a 
new "community" of symbiotically related firms and actors who, through individual and 
collective action, invest resources in and transform a technological invention into a 
commercially viable business’. To the above, Turcan & Fraser (2016) add that the initial 
catalyst is a new venture that is the seed for the birth of the new industry and conjecture that 
unless at least one new venture achieves legitimacy threshold in a new industry there is no 
possibility for that industry to become institutionalized. 
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) extend Van de Ven and Garud’s model suggesting that new 
ventures and new industries lack cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy, defined respectively 
as knowledge about the new activity and what is needed to succeed in an industry, and as the 
value placed on the new activity by cultural norms and political authorities. Their model, 
however, does not capture the process of (co)-emergence and (co)-legitimation of new 
venture and new industry, and assumes the presence of emerging competition as well as of 
sophisticated institutional context – these gaps remain in the literature (Turcan & Fraser, 
2016).  
Hannan and Freeman (1977) were among the first who pioneered the study of the 
evolution of industries from the population-ecology perspective – advancing a population-
ecology theory of birth, survival, and death of organizations. According to Hannan and 
Freeman (1977; 1993), a set of general processes affects the rate of organizational population: 
competition within and across populations for capital, members, and other limited resources; 
legitimation; aging, in the case of mortality; and environmental abundance and constraints. At 
this level, the population and not the individual firm or individual entrepreneur is the unit of 
  
10 
 
analysis. That is, the population-ecology theory treats organizations as black boxes, closed to 
inspection of their inner workings (Bygrave & Hofer, 1991). Moreover, its probabilistic 
predictive power for populations has never been proven (Bygrave, 1993). 
The extant research and policy papers on the evolution of DTFI focus mainly on the 
impact of labour and employment (Olsen, Ibsen, & Westergård-Nielsen, 2004), industrial 
relations (Christensen, 2010), location (EMCC, 2008), strategic marketing and current trends 
and value chain strategies (Jensen & Poulsen, 2013) on growth, and changes in DTFI as well 
as on key decisions related for example to shifting or relocating production or switching to 
mass-production of fashion clothing or enacting protectionism or deregulation. Additional 
recent industry studies could be highlighted, focusing on the evolution and changes in various 
industries and countries: textile industry (1974-1997) within the US south (Anderson, 
Schulman & Wood, 2001), energy (1960-2018) in Taiwan and Korea (Kim, 2019), plastic 
industry in Brazil (Da Silva, Guevara & Gonzalez, 2019), mining industry (1980-2016) in 
Chile (Katz & Pietrobelli, 2018) and mechanical watch industry (1970-2008) in Switzerland 
(Raffaelli, 2018). These studies demonstrate that in volatile global and local economic and 
political environments, it is critical, inter alia, to develop and implement appropriate and 
timely policy instruments to support continuous innovation processes at industry and firm 
levels, encourage and promote environmental and sustainability efforts, streamline the 
cooperation of all key stakeholders, and facilitate re-definition of existing values, meanings, 
structures and priorities. We build on these studies by conducting a systematic, fine-grained 
analysis of emergence and evolution of DTFI aiming to contribute to a better understanding of 
emergence and evolution of industries. 
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DTFI Case: Research Approach, Basic Findings 
We employed integrative review approach aiming to review, critique, and synthesize a 
representative body of knowledge on the emergence and evolution of DFTI in “…an 
integrated way such that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated” 
(Torraco, 2005, p. 356). To investigate the emergence and evolution of DTFI we collected 
historical, unobtrusive measures between 1945 and 2015 in the form of running records such 
as mass media and government records and episodic and private records such as sales, 
industrial and institutional records (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 2000). We 
consulted a number of sources such as Business History yearbooks, industry case studies, 
Danish national statistics, Global Association databases, institutional reports, private company 
reports and industry online news, yielding approximately 450 pages of unobtrusive data. We 
employed NVivo qualitative analysis software package to code, memo, analyse, and interpret 
the data (NVivo data analysis details are available upon request).  
Following the integrative review approach, we started with conceptual structuring of 
the review (Table 1). We identified three frames of reference to accurately code, classify and 
analyse the data: (1) macro, meso and micro levels: global, country, industry, company, 
process and strategy; (2) context level: DTFI’s size, mission, location, knowledge, growth and 
structure; and (3) time level: evolution, epochs, and episodes.  
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
The first two frames of reference build on earlier conceptualization of late globalization. To 
identify the third frame of reference, we borrow the MNE international evolution framework 
from Kutschker, Bäurle & Schmid, (1977) to examine the evolution of DTFI; it consists of 
three ‘Es’: evolution, episodes and epochs. In the life of an industry, evolution represents 
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“small variations” (Kutschker et al., 1977, p. 105) in macro, meso and micro levels of the 
industry over time and episodes indicate turning points or critical events. A critical event is an 
event that deviates significantly, either positively or negatively, from what is normal or 
expected (Edvardsson, 1992). A turning point refers to two points in time, i.e., for a turning 
point to exist, there should be a passage of sufficient time between the two points, making 
sure that the direction of the course (trajectory) has been changed either in direction or in 
nature (Abbott, 2006). According to Abbott (2006), a turning point is also a process that 
involves a course correction: it redirects the path, and requires certain strategies and choices. 
Industry epochs “…are characterized by a specific pattern and an underlying idea which 
dominate the stream of …activities for a certain period” (Kutschker et al., 1977, p. 106). 
To identify DTFI’s evolution, episodes and epochs, we employed events listing, 
critical events, and case dynamics matrixes; Appendix 1 provides a summary of major critical 
events and turning points in the evolution of DTFI. Data analysis points to four epochs and 
six episodes that DTFI went through between 1945 and 2015 (Figure 1). The emerged epochs 
are: (I) Changing production type; (II) Resisting relocating production; (III) Accelerated 
globalization; and (IV) Focusing on e-commerce. The emerged episodes are: (1) Abolishing 
protectionism; (2) In-house design; (3) Change from within; (4) Breaking-up global value 
chains; (5) Strategic outsourcing; and (6) Acquisition of global R&Ds and e-shops. 
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
To explore causal links between various frames of reference and levels of analysis 
across and within evolution periods, especially explore what led to what, when, and why, we 
employed causal mapping (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Specifically, based on iterative coding 
of the data in NVivo, we mapped the chronological flow of critical events and turning points, 
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identified main institutional players who enacted various changes in DTFI and in the textile 
sector internationally, and explored the consequences or effects on DTFI evolution and 
metamorphoses, aiming to understand inter alia how the quality of their decisions impacted 
the evolution of the industry. Appendix 2 maps the emerging causal links.   
To conduct further in-depth analysis of each episode, we employ radar charts to 
display and discuss the observations of the industry variables: size, mission, location, 
knowledge, growth and structure (Figure 2). Size represents number of companies and 
number of workers in the industry. Mission indicates herein the primary purpose and focus of 
the industry. Location denotes relocating decisions mainly of the production. Knowledge 
represents knowledge accumulation and sophistication. Growth indicates industry revenue. 
Structure signifies institutional – regulatory, normative and cognitive – structural changes of 
the industry. The degree of change for a specific variable represents the effects of critical 
effects, turning points and relative decisions on that variable within each episode. Each chart 
displays a degree of change for a variable: the farther away a variable is from the centre of a 
radar chart, the higher is the degree of change of that variable. For example, in Figure 2, 
during Episode 2: In-house design, major concerns were centred on boosting or creating new 
knowledge (via radical innovation, R&D) despite a sharp decline in productivity growth and 
downsizing trends in the industry. These were pursued during a wide-ranging sentiment 
towards resisting relocating production and preserving or defending the extant mission and 
structure of the sector.   
 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
 
DTFI Case: Detailed Findings and Discussion  
As mentioned, the textile industry is almost a quintessential platform for discussing 
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international trade and globalization, from historical (Riello & Parthasarathi, 2011), 
contemporary (Frederick & Startiz, 2012) and spacial perspectives (Anderson et al., 2001). In 
what follows, the findings are specific to Denmark, but of course embedded in the overall 
context of the global textile and fashion industries. 
 
Epoch I: Changing Production Type   
The post-war economic optimism contributed to the transformation of textile and clothing 
industry worldwide. Fashion culture started to re-emerge in the form of a global demand for 
“ready-to-wear” clothing (Spandet-Møller, 2011). To meet this demand for “ready-to-wear” 
clothing, textile and clothing companies had to rethink their ways of production and 
manufacturing, as well as acquire new knowledge of fashion design. Data suggest that 
protectionism dominated the course of activities and decisions during this period 
(Christensen, 2010). The dilemma was whether to reinforce or abolish protectionism. 
 
Episode 1: Abolishing Protectionism 
The Danish Government abolished any protectionism to encourage demand-driven production 
and exporting of clothing products. Abolishing protectionism had an adverse effect on DTFI 
and its companies. On one side, abolishing protectionism made local companies vulnerable to 
global free trade competition. On the other, local companies not only were not ready to cope 
with international and global competitors, they were inefficient and at time resistant or 
reluctant to respond to new fashion trends and new challenges and requirements of 
international markets (Christensen, 2010). Globalization trends indeed were forcing the sector 
to consider changing its mission from ‘labour-intensive mass-production’ to ‘demand-driven 
production’ and becoming more knowledge-intensive sector.  
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Embracing ‘demand-driven production’ was a trade-off between sacrificing the size of 
the sector and staying flexible against global competitors (see also, Locke, 2013). This shift in 
the mission of the sector also demanded new professions from a local labour market: not just 
production-line workers, but also design specialists. Towards the end of this period, DTFI 
could be characterized as downsized sector with demand-driven mission that was in need for 
fashion design knowledge. Data suggest that there was disconnect or incongruity between 
governmental industrial policies and sector companies’ capabilities. This led to significant 
shrinkage of DTFI; those companies that continued their ‘going concern’ were preoccupied 
mainly with their survival trying to export on demand. Toward the end of this epoch, overall 
performance (growth) of the sector increased substantially. 
 
Epoch II: Resisting Relocating Production  
This period is characterized by continuous shrinkage of DTFI. The reason for this mainly is 
twofold. On one side, globalization trends such as low-cost-labour arbitrage, exposure to 
global free trade and global economic recession made textile and clothing sectors worldwide 
remarkably smaller (see also, Anderson et al., 2001; Craik, 2015). On the other, the Danish 
Government enacted protectionism policy in an attempt to mitigate the trading threats from 
new, stronger competitor from Southern European countries, like Spain and Portugal. Data 
suggest that resistance to relocate production, notwithstanding global trends, dominated the 
course of activities and decisions during this period (Jensen & Poulsen, 2013; see also Adler, 
2004; English, 2006). Data analysis singles out two episodes that are related to this epoch. 
One episode reflects survival by shrinkage and in-house design; the other episode is about 
failure of protectionism and change from within. 
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Episode 2: In-house Design 
The Danish Government protectionism policy was coupled with a sector-wide mission to keep 
the whole value-chain in-house, in the country, mainly to maintain the level of employment. 
The decision to keep companies’ value-chains in-house was taken in spite of the fact that 
global economic recession changed public consumption toward cheaper clothing and that 
international competitors started relocating their production to low-cost countries (Jensen & 
Poulsen, 2013). The intention was to balance this decision with manipulation of imports of 
clothing products from low-cost countries. 
Such industrial protectionism policy and the ‘advice’ to keep the whole value-chain 
in-house, however, created tensions among local companies and eventually led to the decrease 
of sector performance (Jensen & Poulsen, 2013). Those companies that followed the policy 
and the advice had to downsize by laying off employees, whereas some even ceased trading – 
hence contributing further to the shrinkage of DTFI. Others decided to go against the 
established regulations and norms and commenced partial re-location of low-value parts of 
their value chains.  
In fact, this resistance sparked the emergence of Danish MNEs in DTFI along the 
emergence of MNEs (initially) from Southern Europe. Another outcome of these tensions was 
that Danish companies started appreciating the idea of breaking down own value chains and 
creating instead global value chains while keeping value-added activities such as design in-
house. By the end of this period, design knowledge had become a truly global commodity.    
 
Episode 3: Change from within 
During this episode, low-cost production centres mushroomed in Eastern Europe, Latin 
America and South East Asia. Labour-intensive industries, incl., textile and clothing, were 
going truly global giving rise to numerous MNEs, encouraging re-location of production to 
  
17 
 
low-cost countries as well as giving birth to the notion of ‘outsourcing’ (see e.g., Adler, 2004; 
Hamzah, 2012). ‘Fast-fashion’ culture was emerging, demanding shorter lead-time from 
design to production to sales and thus challenging the way companies were organizing and 
managing their value chains (Spandet-Møller, 2011).  
The Association of Danish Employers responded to these global trends by initiating a 
strategic development project called "change from within", targeting Danish manufacturers. 
Key idea of this project was to compete through "automation" as an alternative to low-cost 
global competition. This project – that in a way was a revised protectionism policy - however 
failed to deliver expected results, especially to decrease lead-time and prices. This led to 
further shrinkage of the sector: companies had to lay off employees and in the middle of 1980 
the level of workforce started to decrease again (Jensen & Poulsen, 2013). In the end this 
revision of the industrial protectionism policy failed to offer cheaper products compared to 
those offered by Asian and Southern European manufacturers and eventually led to a decline 
of exporting. 
A by-product of the revised protectionism policy was an increase of the level of 
outflow FDI that towards the end of the period exceeded dramatically the inflow of FDI 
(Spandet-Møller, 2011). This tendency was caused by the decision of Danish textile and 
clothing companies to relocate their production to the countries with location advantages and 
accessible global networks as well as to engage in subcontracting and outsourcing – 
phenomena that were just getting traction during this period.  
It was interesting to observe – interesting for that period dominated by MNEs – that 
smaller companies were frontrunners in changing and adapting their business models and 
engaging way earlier than MNEs and without any regard for actual policies in relocation of 
production and outsourcing. The above movements prompted the Association of Danish 
Employers to reformulate the sector development policy in 1987 and to recommend relocating 
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and engaging in outsourcing (Jensen & Poulsen, 2013). Towards the end of the period, the 
value of Danish exports increased, especially to Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany and 
Great Britain, demonstrating the potential advantages from international and global 
integration.  
 
Epoch III: Accelerated globalization  
Data suggest that this epoch is characterized by accelerated globalization. End of the Cold 
War, fall of Berlin Wall, collapse of Soviet Union, radical reforms in China, Denmark joining 
EU and WTO are examples of major global trends that took place during this period and 
drove this break-up process. Opening up Eastern European market brought up numerous 
market opportunities as well as cheap labour arbitrage opportunities, but also new 
competition. Radical reforms in China started making impact on its growth, witnessing an 
increase in exporting from China that threatened local clothing and textile companies (Lardy, 
2005; Zhang, 2006). Two episodes mark this epoch: breaking-up global value chains and 
strategic outsourcing. 
 
Episode 4: Breaking-up Global Value Chains 
The Danish Government eventually gave in resisting globalization and embraced 
globalization, accepting ‘anti-protectionism’ policy for the sector. Danish companies started 
breaking up their value chain, actively seeking cost-efficient relocation of production, while 
keeping design and branding in house. Data suggest that Danish companies were successful in 
pursuing relocation and outsourcing strategies. Embracing globalization and responding to 
global trends by splitting up companies’ value chains, offshoring, acquisitions and 
outsourcing contributed towards the enhancement of sector competitiveness and development 
of sector core value adding activities, such as ‘in-house design’.  
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Demand for knowledge in fashion design and shop-in-shop branding was increasing as 
well. During this period, Danish companies initiated the restructuring of their value chain 
strategies from CMT (Cut, Make and Trim) and OPT (Outward Processing Traffic) in 1980s 
to SOD (Sourcing from Own Design), putting more emphasis on high value-added activities 
such as design and branding (Jensen & Poulsen, 2013). At the same time, data point to a 
number of casualties: companies with more than 600 employees were not able to adapt and 
reformulate their growth strategy – e.g., re-locate and/or outsource – and eventually ceased 
trading. It is important to mention that these same strategic activities led to further shrinkage 
of the sector in number of employees and restructuring of the sector. 
 
Episode 5: Strategic Outsourcing 
In this period the role of China in global trade continued increasing, including an attractive 
import policies that had a tremendous impact on manufacturing sectors worldwide. Toward 
the middle of this period Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia joined EU. This allowed Danish 
companies to access new trading and production partners as an alternative to South European 
expensive partners. Another global trend that had a negative impact also on DTFI was the 
financial crisis in 2008 (Dholakia & Turcan, 2014).  
Danish companies took full advantage of these new offshoring and outsourcing 
opportunities. Such wilful, determined strategic outlook towards outsourcing contributed to 
further shrinkage of the sector as many sector companies moved production abroad; some 
even changed their business models from production just to design, sales and marketing. Also 
during this period consolidation of the sector took place: larger companies started acquiring 
smaller companies that had specific knowledge, high-tech or know-how capabilities. 
Gradually the core mission of the sector moved towards ‘intelligent textile’ concept 
that included primarily wearable electronics as well as new materials, textures and surfaces. 
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This change of sector identify to high-tech fabric required new knowledge in design, R&D, 
and production. This led to a launch of new study programs in Danish Higher Education 
sector that were training future employees for DTFI sector (Spandet-Møller, 2011). This new 
mission contributed to a split between textiles manufacturing that was concerned with 
production of high-tech fabrics and selling it to B2B niche markets and clothing production 
that redirected clothing value chains toward fast fashion market trends. It could be argued that 
in this period DTFI became truly global.    
 
Epoch IV: Focus on E-Commerce  
Focus on e-commerce characterizes this epoch’s course of activities and decisions (see e.g., 
Leamer & Storper, 2001; Kraemer, 2005; Martin et al., 2018). During this epoch, new global 
trends were emerging and getting traction quite rapidly, namely social media, e-commerce 
and on-line shopping (Kraemer, 2005; Puig, 2009; Millar, 2011; UNCTAD, 2013; Nielsen, 
2014). Thanks to these trends, the number of companies in the fashion-sector increased; 
however, an increase in costs of raw material had a negative impact on companies from the 
textile sub-sector – several manufacturers ceased their trading due to this trend. At the same 
time, traditional global trends were present in this epoch as well, such as rise of labour and 
material costs in China and India which made DTFI companies to search for new low-cost 
locations to relocate or outsource such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, Egypt, and 
Myanmar. The episode related to this epoch is about acquiring global R&D centres, global 
brands and e-shops. 
 
Episode 6: Acquisition of Global R&Ds and E-Shops 
SMEs from the fashion sub-sector were quicker in adopting e-commerce compared to their 
counterparts from the textile sub-sector. To keep up with global trends, policymakers changed 
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the name of the sector from ‘Textile and Clothing’ to ‘Textile and Fashion’ (Spandet-Møller, 
2011). New education programs were launched to support this new identity of the sector. 
Given the new identity or mission of the sector, i.e., intelligent textile or high-tech fabric, 
textile companies were searching globally for companies that possessed respective knowledge 
and capabilities, especially knowledge in latest R&D, sales and marketing for the purpose of 
acquiring such companies or entering strategic alliances. This strategy was also aimed at 
ensuring quality control and production costs at the foreign partner premises. At the same 
time fashion companies during this period pursued aggressively acquisition strategies in 
Europe by acquiring European fashion brands and e-shops. These acquisition strategies inter 
alia were aimed to deter entry of competitors form Asian on-line shops. DTFI witnessed slow, 
but steady increase in size during this period and was becoming an e-sector taking advantage 
of digitalization trend as well as new modern infrastructure and knowledge built and created. 
 
Concluding Observations  
Late Globalization: Key Conclusions from DTFI Case  
The data suggest that DTFI is a late globalizer. Government industrial policies were 
instrumental in shaping the development and growth of the sector. In particular, protectionist 
policies held back DTFI from globalizing earlier. DTFI started to globalize in the early 1990s 
by relocation and offshoring of production and in early 2000s actively pursued strategic 
outsourcing.   
DTFI is largely concentrated geographically around the big Danish cities. The 
Copenhagen and Jutland geographies – historically separated by bodies of water (and only 
recently connected by bridges and tunnels) – also split up the two main sectors in DTFI, 
reflecting a symbolic manifestation of the diversity of the business. The evolution of the 
industry has led to divided and separated ‘Textile’ and ‘Fashion’ industries, a rift that was 
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only healed in 2012 by changing the label of the industry to DTFI (Jensen & Poulsen, 2013). 
Currently, in Jutland the industry exists around cities like Herning, Ikast, and Brande – which 
host mostly large Textile manufacturers and clothing companies (Christensen, 2010). The 
other substantial part of the industry, the high-value fashion design part, however, is 
concentrated around Copenhagen, mainly composed of design-driven SMEs. Some other 
large sections are concentrated around Ringkøbing as well as Vejle, which belong to the 
Danish traditional era within the textile production sites. Furthermore, two major design 
colleges are located at Kolding School of Design and TEKO design school in Jutland, so that 
about 10% of the design companies are located in each area; and there is Aarhus – the largest 
city in Jutland – that also counts for approximately 10% of the total (Christensen, 2010). 
 
Pre-Epoch I 
Although the first cotton manufacturing company, publicly known as Manchester Factory, 
was established in 1779 outside Copenhagen, the most significant early step in the 
mechanization of textile production was I.C. Modeweg, which was founded as a cloth (textile) 
manufacturer in the centre of Copenhagen in 1809, which, later, in 1831, relocated to Brede, 
in the countryside north of Copenhagen.   
Between 1840 and 1865, modern industry gained footing in Denmark, and in 1846 
Modewegs cloth mill in Brede was the first to adopt multiple new technologies. In 1892, a 
spinning plant was established in Vejle on the east coast of Jutland, using ring spinning 
machines for the first time in Denmark. Another spinning plant was established in the same 
town a few years later, and together with some major cotton weaving plants, and other plants 
were established in the following years, among them a large one in Valby, Copenhagen 
(Christensen, 2010).  
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Epoch I 
There is no concrete evidence indicating the relocation of the industry within Denmark during 
Epoch I, as changes in production type led to inevitable changes in the vulnerable older 
Danish textile and clothing sector. At the start of Epoch I, post-war economic optimism and 
emergence of fashion culture were the main legacy for the industry. Production by demand 
dominated the coping strategy to survive. Several manufactures that held large single-
production sites were forced to bring up-, mid- and downstream activities to Denmark 
(Spandet-Møller, 2011).  
 
Epoch II  
New countries were becoming active textile producers and exporters, able to compete on the 
world market, based on their comparatively lower wages. In Herning-Ikast-Brande district, 
specifically, employment continued to increase. Thus, the area experienced considerable 
absolute and relative increases in employment levels up to the early 1970s.  In the 1980s and 
1990s, a large proportion of the cluster’s manufacturing activities were relocated to low-cost 
countries in Europe. Generally, the area of Herning-Ikast-Brande became recognised in the 
international and national literature on company clusters, of both a theoretical and an 
empirical nature, describing it as a well-established cluster within the textiles and clothing 
sector (EMCC, 2008).  
At the same time, Egetæpper, a successful carpet factory, was among the first in 
Europe to invest in computer-controlled dyeing technology, in this region. The last surviving 
major cloth mill, Kjærs Mølle in Ålborg, however, gave up producing textiles for wearable 
clothing in favour of high quality furniture fabrics, under the trade name of Gabriel. In the 
1980s, also, this concentration was particularly important to the companies located in the 
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cluster, as it attracted many potential customers to the area (Laursen, Hansen, & Andersen, 
2002).  
 
Epoch III 
This development signifies the first wave of change in terms of the location of activities in the 
industry in Denmark, mainly from the Copenhagen area of the Danish island of Zealand in 
eastern Denmark to the Jutland area in western Denmark, which includes the Herning-Ikast-
Brande district (EMCC, 2008).   
 
Epoch IV 
With the emergence of e-commerce in the Danish fashion sector 2010, many Danish SMEs 
attempted to improve core activities like sales and marketing using internet. In this regard, 
divesting small markets abroad and increasing focus on local market became inevitable. In 
doing so, the location of DTFI started to be driven by design trends (Spandet-Møller, 2011). 
Also, in April 2013, the World Trade Organization (WTO) dealt officially with the subject of 
e-commerce (Jensen & Poulsen, 2013). It was a major reason for the larger companies located 
in the centre of Jutland like Bestseller, BTX Group, and DK Companies to start producing 
trend-driven fashion. The Copenhagen area – home to mainly small- to medium-sized fashion 
companies – engaged with design-driven fashion, often trend-setting rather than driven by 
trends. In Denmark specifically, SMEs made up more than 30% of export in the early 2010s 
(Christensen, 2010), and the Copenhagen Fashion Council was established in April 2010 with 
the purpose of ensuring an even stronger Copenhagen Fashion Week for the future. 
Interestingly, the number of companies in fashion industry in Zealand (Copenhagen region) 
increased in 2012, even as the overall DTFI firm numbers kept declining (statistikbanken, 
2015). 
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Late Globalization: Research Challenges Ahead  
This longitudinal one-country-and-industry case study – of late globalization of DTFI – points 
to a number of key factors that influence the lateness (or earliness) of globalization: 
government industrial policies toward domestic and foreign players in an industry, global 
competition that shapes and continually reshapes (cost as well as quality-driven) location of 
key value chain activities (and the concomitant global distribution of core competencies and 
skills), and the growing role of information technologies that enable globally-dispersed value 
chains to function in cohesive and unified ways. A large palette of such studies needs to be 
created – varying the industrial, geo-national and temporal contexts – so that patterns can be 
discovered from the juxtapositions of multiple specific sets of insights.  
 In specific terms, we hope the general concept of ‘late globalization’ introduced in the 
early part of this paper and the detailed case study of DTFI in the later part set a stage for 
further work of the following types: 
(a) Industry emergence and evolution studies, going forward into a future where 
‘globalization’ itself is being problematized, bringing in early/late aspects of 
globalization in their discursive frames. 
(b) Theorizing and theory-building work getting done and being disseminated, employing 
cross-disciplinary approaches, about the multiple aspects of the early/late aspects of 
globalization observed the world over. 
 
Late Globalization: Some Final Thoughts 
Of course, these are just some of the major factors, and myriad specific factors were at work 
in the DTFI case. The situation circa 2015 in Denmark clearly shows intersections of 
globalization and microgeographies. The trend-driven larger firms in Denmark are under 
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intense cost-competitive pressure and likely to shrink, affecting Jutland region. The design-
driven, trend-setting smaller firms, mainly clustered in Copenhagen-Zealand region, have 
strong future prospects, boosting not just their own fortunes, but also the larger art-culture 
scene in vibrant Copenhagen. Conceptually, in the late globalization phase of DTFI, we find 
traditional ‘hard’ globalization elements (costs of factors of production, logistical access) are 
beginning to interact with ‘soft’ elements such as vibrant urban lifestyles, innovative design 
sensibilities, and creative institutions. In a theoretical sense, considerable more work is 
needed on how the soft design-aesthetic-lifestyle factors are shaping late, as well as nascent 
(e.g., in robotics or AI fields) globalization. As we continue our research exploration of late 
globalization through other countries and industries, we hope to uncover and conceptually 
reinforce these and other building blocks for a theory of late globalization. 
 To get deeper insights into the phenomena of late globalization, incl., de-globalization 
and de-internationalization (Turcan, 2013b; 2016), the theoretic-analytic levels of late 
globalization phenomena need to oscillate across macro, meso, micro as well as substantive- 
and meta-theoretical levels. We should keep in mind that as humans begin to transcend the 
limits of planet Earth, the denotative as well as connotative aspects of the term ‘globalization’ 
will begin to crumble. This is already of course evident in science fiction films (e.g., 
‘Elysium’, where the well-off escape a wretched Earth to live in a salubrious, orbiting space 
colony). Before reality reaches such sci-fi stages, the work on late globalization issues needs 
to intensify – to create a good conceptual foundation for the post-global studies that are surely 
around the corner. 
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Table 1: Effects of late globalization on evolution of DTFI 
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Figure 1: Evolution, episodes and epochs of DTFI 
 
Note: 
Industry evolution (zigzag line) represents small variations in macro, meso and micro levels of the industry over time.  
Industry epochs are characterized by a specific pattern and an underlying idea which dominates the stream of activities for a 
certain period. 
Industry episodes mark critical events or turning points in the life of the industry. 
Epoch I: Changing production type; Epoch II: Resisting relocating production; Epoch III: Accelerated globalization; Epoch 
IV: Focusing on e-commerce. 
E1: Abolishing protectionism; E2: In-house design; E3: Change from within; E4: Breaking-up global value chains; E5: 
Strategic outsourcing; E6: Acquisition of global R&Ds and e-shops.     
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Figure 2: Evolution of DTFI variables 
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Appendix 1: Critical event matrix 
 Global Country/Industry Company/Process/Strategy 
1945-
1970 
Post WWII economic optimism/boom 
Emergence of “Fashion Culture” followed by 
“ready to wear” trend 
Protectionism in Denmark abolished  
Emergence of Danish welfare state 
Emergence of free trade agreements 
Publication of DFTI sector journal  
Price competition rises 
Large and oldest  Danish manufacturers with 
single production line closed down  
Decline of traditional production of fabrics  
Demand-driven production emerges 
Propensity toward export on demand  
1971-
1980 
Global  free trade regulations established 
Western economic recession unfolds 
South Europe, Latin America and South East 
Asia join clothing market 
Low- cost labor arbitrage emerges 
Lead-time from design to production 
shortened  
Multi-Fiber Arrangement sets boundaries for 
global textile exports  
Demand for consumer goods declines 
Denmark joins ECC 
ECC members and Multi-Fiber Arrangement imposed  
import quotas 
Change in public consumption toward synthetic 
fabrics   
Relocation of labor- intensive industries to low-cost 
countries takes place  
Increased demand for design knowledge in production  
Danish “In-House” manufacturing policy 
implemented  
Textile and clothing industry shrinks  
Danish Clothing Association and Danish 
technological textile institute fight for protectionism 
Emergence of low-cost production opportunities in 
Southern Europe  
Investing in computer-controlled dyeing 
technology (first in Europe by Egetæpper A/S) 
Switching from production of textile for 
clothing toward high quality furniture fabrics 
(Gabriel) 
Danish MNEs emerge 
Beginning to relocate low-stream value chain 
activities to Southern Europe and keep value 
added activities like design in Denmark  
1981-
1990 
Price liberalization as part of European 
integration  
Regulations set to support free flow of capital 
in ECC  
Trend of “fast- fashion” culture accelerates 
Collapse of Berlin Wall 
Increased demand for moving production and 
outsourcing to Eastern Europe, Latin America 
and South East Asia 
 
 
Customer demand for design increases 
Emergence of relocation of mid-stream production to 
low cost countries  
Outsourcing trend gets traction 
Fashion cloths became available in supermarkets 
“Change from within” policy initiated by Association 
of Danish Employers 
Automation introduced to fight low-cost global 
competition 
Danish Clothing Association revised protectionism 
policy 
Moving most of sewing abroad 
Brandtex started offshoring to Poland 
Vanggard (>600 employees) ceased trading  
Growing number of Danish MNEs offshore to 
Southern and Central Europe 
Setting High expectations for lead-time from 
design to production 
Rise of OPT (Outward Processing Traffic) 
strategy  
Adopting innovation-driven branding 
strategies and individual design 
1991- European Union established; launch of euro  Anti-protectionism sentiments rise  Axcel, newly founded company, started  
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 Global Country/Industry Company/Process/Strategy 
2000 Denmark joined EU and WTO 
Cold War ends 
Soviet Union collapses; opening of Eastern 
Europe  
Dot-com Bubble 
Chain’s rapid economic growth began  
Trade liberalization in India  
Outsourcing takes traction and reshapes sector 
Integration of Denmark clothing into GATT/WTP  
Increased pressure from fast fashion  
Globalizing value chain activities became main stream  
Growth Fund created  
Danish companies preferred free trade  
investing in fashion brands  
Emergence of shop-in-shop opportunities 
‘Cut, Make and Trim’ and ‘Sourcing form 
Own Design’ shaped offshoring and value 
chain globalization  
Fully-integrated value chain strategy failed 
2001-
2010 
Financial crisis; EU recession  
China joined WTO/Trade liberalization in 
China 
Emergence of Internationalization of design 
education 
Eastern European countries join EU  
Multi Fibre Arrangements expired  
Increased demand for fashion apparels such as shoes 
and jewelry 
Growing Danish production in China  
Emergence of new material such as intelligent textiles 
Copenhagen becomes capital of innovation-driven 
fashion 
Increased concerns about losing production know-how 
due to outsourcing  
Rise of equity funds in DTFI  
Initial wave of Danish e-commerce 
DTFI shifted focus away from production towards 
high-value adding and knowledge intensive activities, 
such as design and branding 
Increased success in subcontracting production  
Outsourcing of production becomes part of 
growth strategies  
Continued focus on high-value adding 
activities 
Partnership strategy 
Acquiring new non-Danish brands 
Main internationalization destinations were 
China, South East Asia, US, Vietnam, South 
Africa 
SMEs were contributing more than 30% in 
exports 
2011-
2015 
Recovery of German, Swedish and 
Norwegian economies  
Chinese companies move toward value-added 
products charging premium prices  
India increased price pressure on cotton 
Global increase of price for raw materials  
China: Manufacturing base is reduced 
following global recession; Increased 
competition  
E-commerce in WTO spotlight 
Asia’s e-commerce growth rates in double 
digits  
Opportunities open up in developing 
economies  
E-commerce becomes mainstream  
Women’s clothing was on top in online shopping  
New record in online spending: 55 billion DKK  
Higher education institutions offer a range of short-
cycle study programs in design 
DTFI reached 30 billion DKK annual turnover 
becoming the 4th largest exporter  
Industry changes its name to ‘Textile and Fashion’ 
Government recommendations to outsource to 
Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, Egypt, and 
Myanmar 
Developing online shopping regulations 
Increased demand for high-tech products  
Globalization via acquisitions accelerates 
aiming  to develop architecture & design 
brands in Europe and Asia in fabric and textile 
sector  
Acquisitions of  high-tech suppliers in textile 
sector     
Acquisition of e-shops 
Clothing companies focus at home on sales 
and marketing  
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Appendix 2: Causal mapping 
 
 
